This paper demonstrates that fat-tailed distributions of trade volume and stock returns emerge in a simultaneous-move herding model of rational traders who infer other traders' private information on the value of assets by observing aggregate actions.
Since Mandelbrot [27] and Fama [14] , it has been well established that the short-term stock returns exhibit a fat-tailed, leptokurtic distribution. Jansen and de Vries [20] , for example, estimated the exponent of the power-law tail to be in the range 3 to 5, which warrants a finite variance and yet deviates greatly from the normal distribution in the fourth moment. This anomaly in the tail and kurtosis has been considered as a reason for the excess volatility of stock returns.
Efforts to explain this anomaly have been ongoing for long. A traditional economic explanation for the excess volatility of the volumes and returns relies on the traders' rational herd behavior. In a situation where a trader's private information on the asset value is partially revealed by her transaction, the trader's action can cause an avalanche of similar actions by the other traders. This idea of a chain reaction through the revelation of private information has been extensively studied in the literature of herd behavior, informational cascade, and information aggregation. However, there have been few attempts to explain the fat tail in this framework. This paper shows that the chain reaction of information revelation leads to the fat-tail distributions of the traders' aggregate actions and asset returns. I consider a model of a large number of informed traders who receive imperfect private information on the true value of an asset. The traders simultaneously choose whether to buy one unit of the asset or not to buy at all. I consider a rational expectations equilibrium in which each trader submits her demand schedule conditional on price. The trader's rational choice is based on her private information as well as the information revealed by the other traders' actions through the equilibrium price.
The price is set by an auctioneer who aggregates the informed traders' demand and matches the demand with the supply schedule submitted by uninformed traders. The 1 equilibrium is a mapping from the space of private information of all traders to that of the aggregate actions. The larger the aggregate buying action, the more is the traders' subjective belief on the state of a high asset value, and the more likely each trader is to buy the asset. Hence, the traders' strategy exhibits complementarity, and their actions are positively correlated.
I derive the probability distribution of the equilibrium aggregate action and show that it decays as a power function with exponential truncation. The speed of the exponential truncation is determined by the strength of the strategic complementarity among traders. This analytical result is obtained by a new method that utilizes a fictitious stochastic tatonnement process to characterize the aggregate actions. The power-law distribution implies a large kurtosis. Thus, the power-law result illustrates that a significant magnitude of aggregate risk exists even when the uncertainty in the transaction volume solely stems from the idiosyncratic private information drawn by a large number of traders. I extend the model dynamically in which the traders receive private information repeatedly. Suppose that the initial belief started far below the threshold belief. Then, traders buy only if they receive extremely good news. As private information is accumulated over time, however, the average belief increases toward a threshold at which some traders start buying regardless of the other traders' inactions. Such traders' buying actions trigger the other traders' buying, which results in a herd that follows a power-law distribution. This process implies that a large amount of private information tends to be revealed at once around the point of time when the average belief reaches some threshold. Thus, even though the subjective belief converges to the true value of an asset in the long run, the price process toward the true value can deviate significantly from the smooth path that would occur if the private information is fully 2 revealed in each period. A sizable portion of the total price adjustment toward the true value is accounted for by the rare events of synchronized actions of a large number of traders.
The model can account for the non-normal, fat-tailed distribution of daily stock returns. The private information partially revealed by informed traders in the equilibrium transaction is reflected in the resulting shift in the price. I define the difference in the logarithm of price as the stock return. The impact of the transaction volume on the return is determined by the supply function of uninformed traders (or "liquidity suppliers"), which is calibrated as in Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley [15] .
Each realization of the private information profile results in an equilibrium return, and thus, the returns distribution is obtained by Monte Carlo simulations of information draws. The simulated distribution is shown to resemble well the daily returns distribution observed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
As a herding model, our model is analogous to the Keynes' beauty contest. Each trader recognizes that the other traders have private information that is as valuable as her own. When each trader tries to match with the behavior of an average trader, the resulting equilibrium exhibits fragility due to perfect strategic complementarity. In addition, if the trader's action is discrete, the equilibrium becomes locally unique and allows quantitative characterization of the fluctuations due to the randomness in private information. This paper formalizes the idea of perfect strategic complementarity among the traders with private information, and shows that a power-law distribution of the aggregate actions emerges naturally in this setup.
An extensive array of literature addresses the issue of imitative behavior in financial markets. The models of herd behavior and informational cascade by Scharfstein and Stein [32] , Banerjee [4] , and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [5] have been applied 3 to financial market crashes by Lee [24] and Chari and Kehoe [10] among others. While the benchmark herd behavior model provides a robust intuition for rational herding, it typically exhibits an all-or-nothing herding due to its particular information structure implied by sequential trading. Some modification is due in order to apply the intuition of herd behavior to stochastic fluctuations. Gul and Lundholm [16] , for example, have demonstrated an emergence of stochastic herding by endogenizing the traders' choice of waiting time. I extend this line of research by employing a simple simultaneousmove model of traders. This approach is related to Caplin and Leahy [9] who argue that the aggregate revelation of dispersed information in the market tends to occur suddenly as the last straw that breaks the camel's back. Stretching their analogy, this paper claims that, when the camel's back breaks, the rupture size is distributed according to a power law. Another underlying theme of this paper is the aggregation of private information (Vives [37] ) or idiosyncratic shocks (Jovanovic [21] ; Durlauf [13] ). This paper shows that the aggregation of private information in the market leads to a non-trivial, structured fluctuation that is characterized by a power law.
The technical analysis I employ is linked to the field of critical phenomena in statistical physics. Recently, a number of statistical physicists investigated the empirical fluctuations of financial markets.
1 Some papers in this literature reproduce the empirical power laws by introducing the methodology used for critical phenomena to the herd behavior models (Bak, Paczuski, and Shubik [2] ; Cont and Bouchaud [11] ; Stauffer and Sornette [36] ). Two questions have been raised for the models of critical phenomena.
One is that they lack the model of traders' purposeful behavior and rational learning, which hinders the integration of their methodology to the existing body of financial 1 A survey of these attempts is provided in Bouchaud and Potters [7] and Mantegna and Stanley [28] .
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economics. The other is a fundamental question as to why at all the market has to exhibit criticality. The power-law fluctuation occurs typically only at the critical value of a parameter that governs the connectivity of the networked traders. Gabaix et al. [15] address these questions by incorporating the trader's optimal behavior and by relating the power laws for the volumes and returns to Zipf's law for the size distribution of firms. This paper proposes an alternative by showing that the market necessarily converges to the critical point as a result of the purposeful behavior of individual traders who gain information from each other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a simple static model is presented. Section 3 analytically derives the power-law distribution and provides an intuition for the mechanism behind the fat tail. The model is also extended dynamically, and the power-law distribution is shown to occur at the state in which the heterogeneous beliefs of traders evolve. Section 4 shows by numerical simulations that the equilibrium volumes follow a power law and that the equilibrium returns distribution matches its empirical counterpart. Section 5 discusses the role of discrete actions and symmetric information structure in the model. Section 6 concludes.
Model

Model and equilibrium
In this section, I consider the simplest case in which each trader receives private information just once. I consider a financial market with N informed traders, where N is a large finite number. The informed traders do not know the true state of the economy, but each of them receives private information x i that correlates with the state. The signal is private, meaning that trader i does not observe the information received by the other traders. The economy can take one of two possible states, H and L. The asset is worth 1 in state H and 0 in state L. The private information x i is drawn independently across i from a known distribution F in state H and from G in state L.
A share of the asset is assumed to be indivisible, and the unit of transaction is normalized by the number of traders, 1/N . Traders choose either to buy it or not.
The situation where traders choose to sell or not can be symmetrically analyzed. The buying action of trader i is denoted by a i = 1 and the non-buying action is denoted by a i = 0. The informed trader's choice is conditional on the price of asset, p. The demand function of the informed traders is denoted by
In addition to the informed traders, there are uninformed traders who act as liquidity suppliers of the asset. I assume that the uninformed traders have an aggregate supply function S(p), which is upward sloping and satisfies S(p 0 ) = 0. Thus, uninformed traders are contrarians who sell when the price is high and buy when the price is low. The equilibrium price is determined so that it clears the market: D(p) = S(p).
I define a sequence of price points p k , k = 1, 2, . . . , N , at which price the demand from k informed traders is met by suppliers: follows Bru and Vives [8] . Without the information aggregation by the auctioneer, the model becomes similar to that of Minehart and Scotchmer [30] , who showed that the traders cannot agree to disagree in a rational expectations equilibrium, i.e., the equilibrium may not exist, or if it exists, it is a herding equilibrium where all the traders choose the same action. 
Information structure and optimal strategy
I impose a standard assumption that private information has the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). I define an odds function δ(
, where f and g are derivatives of F and G, respectively. MLRP requires δ to be monotone. Without loss of generality, I assume that δ is strictly decreasing. Namely, a larger x i implies a larger likelihood of H. I also assume that the prior belief for H to occur is common across i at b 0 . This assumption is imposed for the sake of simplicity, and is relaxed in Section 3.2, where the belief is allowed to evolve heterogeneously over periods.
Using a likelihood ratio
, the optimality condition for a buying action b i,1 ≥ p is equivalently expressed as θ i,1 ≤ 1/p − 1. Thanks to MLRP, the optimal demand schedule of trader j follows a threshold rule:
wherex(m) denotes the value of private information at which trader j is indifferent between buying and not buying given p m .
Under the threshold rule, the likelihood ratios revealed by an inaction (a j = 0) and by a buying action (a j = 1) are derived as follows, respectively:
As in Smith and Sørensen [34] , MLRP implies that, for any value ofx in the interior of the support of F and G,
and that A(x) and B(x) are strictly decreasing inx: 
the threshold is determined by
Similarly, a trader buying at p k knows that, if the bid is executed, there are k − 1 traders bidding at p k and N − k traders not buying at p k . Then, the thresholdx(k) is 8 obtained by solving
Given the threshold behavior above, I obtain the aggregate demand D(p k ) as the number of informed traders with
since p 0 and p 1 convey the same information to an informed trader that there is no other buying trader, while the purchasing cost p 0 is lower than p 1 . Then, I obtain the following.
Proposition 1 There existsN such that for any N >N , there exists an equilibrium outcome m for each realization of x.
By taking the log-difference of (8), I obtain
Note that inf(log A−log B) is strictly positive and independent of N , while log(1/p k+1 − and its probability distribution is determined by the probability measure of x and the equilibrium selection mapping. By this selection assumption, I exclude the fluctuations that arise purely from informational coordination such as in sunspot equilibria. Thus, under this selection, I can show that even the minimum shift in price log p m * − log p 0 exhibits large fluctuations. I further characterize the probability distribution of m * and p m * in the following sections.
3 Analytical results
Derivation of the power law
In this section, I analytically derive the power-law distribution of the minimum aggregate action m * defined in the model. I propose a method to characterize the distribution of m * by using a fictitious tatonnement process. In so doing, I clarify the condition for the power law of m * and provide an economic interpretation for the mechanism that generates the power law. I assume that the true state of the economy is H throughout the paper. The case of L can be analyzed similarly.
The minimum equilibrium m * is known to be reached by the best response dynamics of traders, which Vives [39] called an informational tatonnement. The best response dynamics requires the traders to know only the "aggregate" information, m in this case. Cooper [12] argued that the parsimonious informational requirement of the best response dynamics makes it a desirable equilibrium selection algorithm when there exist multiple equilibria and when it is difficult for traders to coordinate their actions. can express m * as the sum of increments in the tatonnement process. Moreover, the informational tatonnement can be regarded as a stochastic process, once it is viewed unconditionally on the private information x. Thus, m * can be expressed as the sum of a stochastic process that starts from and converges to zero. I use this tatonnement as an algorithm to compute the minimum aggregate action m * . The idea of characterizing an equilibrium outcome by a stochastic process is similar in spirit to Kirman [23] .
By showing that the thresholdx decreases over the stochastic process, Proposition 2 establishes that there exists a non-trivial chance of a chain reaction during the tatonnement. A trader who chooses to buy in u will continue to choose to buy in u + 1, since the threshold is lowered. A trader who does not buy in u might choose to buy in u + 1. The conditional probability of a non-buying trader switching to buying in response to m u − m u−1 is defined as follows: with population N − m u and probability q u , which is determined by (10) andx u = x(m u /N ). Further, suppose that m 1 follows a binomial distribution with population N and probability q 0 . Then, the minimum equilibrium number of buying traders m * follows the same distribution as m T , the cumulative sum of the process.
Proposition 3 establishes that the minimum equilibrium m * is equal to the sum of a binomial process. A binomial distribution permits Poisson approximation when the population is "large" and the probability is "small." The approximation holds in our tatonnement if the probability q u is of order 1/N . I show that this is the case.
Proposition 4
As N → ∞, the binomial process m u+1 − m u asymptotically follows a branching process with a state-dependent Poisson random variable with mean
Proof: Equation (9) implies thatx(k) −x(k + 1) is of order 1/N . From Equation (10),
. Thus, q u is also of order 1/N . The asymptotic mean of the binomial variable m u+1 − m u conditional on m u − m u−1 = 1 is derived as follows:
where I used (9) and the fact that the difference of log p k is of order 1/N for the second equation and (5) and (6) 
where the second line holds asymptotically as m → ∞.
Proof: The sum m T conditional on m 1 = 1 follows a closed form distribution known as Borel-Tanner distribution in the queuing theory [22] . Equation (14) is derived by mixing the Borel-Tanner distribution and the Poisson distribution for m 1 , and (15) is obtained by applying Stirling's formula [31] . The tail distribution as in (15) is known to be obtained not only for the Poisson branching process but also for any branching process (see Harris [17] and Sornette [35] for the robustness of this result for generalized branching processes). For the case φ > 1, there is a non-zero probability for m * to be infinite. This is because the branching process m u+1 − m u does not reach 0 with a non-zero probability if φ > 1, whereas it reaches 0 in a finite step with probability one if φ ≤ 1.
The exponential tail holds for a large finite m * either for the subcritical case φ < 1 or the supercritical case φ > 1 (Harris [17] ). The speed of exponential truncation is determined by |φ − 1 − log φ|. The speed of the exponential decay slows down as φ becomes close to 1, and disappears when φ = 1. At this critical level φ = 1, the branching process becomes a martingale, and the distribution (14) has a power-law tail.
The power exponent (in the cumulative form) is 0.5, which is less than one, implying that the mean of m * diverges to infinity if φ = 1. The exponent 0.5 is closely related to the same exponent that appears for the distribution of the first return time of a martingale. The diverging mean can also be shown as follows. The branching process has a recursive characteristic, in which the total number of offsprings originating from a child has the same probability distribution as the total number of offsprings originating from the parent of the child. Let H(s) denote the probability generating function of the total number of offsprings generated by one parent, and let J(s) denote the probability generating function of the number of children each parent bears. Then, the relation an action should weigh more or less than that revealed by an inaction. Hence, it is a robust feature of herd behavior models that the chain-reaction mechanism operates near the criticality when the size of traders in terms of informational weights is not extremely diversified.
Dynamic extension
The results in the static model were derived under the assumption of homogeneous prior belief. The results hold even if the prior belief is heterogeneous. A particularly interesting case is when the belief evolves over time as private information is drawn repeatedly. In this case, even though I maintain the assumption that the prior belief in the initial period is homogeneous, the belief in the subsequent periods will be heterogeneous due to the past private information. In this sequence of static equilibria, I
show that the informational tatonnement continues to be characterized as before.
The dynamic extension not only relaxes the assumption of common prior belief but also ensures that the propagation effect shown in the static model is triggered at some point of time. The limiting behavior of q 0 when N → ∞ is ambiguous in the static model. This leaves a possibility that the chain reaction is practically never triggered for a large N if q 0 N → 0. This is because the traders will rarely react to the private information at the beginning of the tatonnement where no other traders reveal their information, if the prior belief is very low.
It turns out in the dynamic model that the traders eventually learn the true state as they accumulate private information. This implies that regardless of the level of the initial prior belief or N , the belief increases to the level at which traders start buying even though the other traders are not buying. This triggers the propagation of buying actions. This dynamics is similar to the self-organized criticality of Bak et al.
[3] with respect to the traders' average belief converging to the state at which the size distribution of herd behavior is characterized by a power law.
Heterogeneous belief
I dynamically extend the basic model as follows. Each trader i draws private information x i,t repeatedly over periods for t = 1, 2, . . .. The private information is identically and independently distributed across traders and periods. I consider the same asset as before that is worth 1 in H and 0 in L. Traders are given an opportunity to buy this asset regardless of their past actions. Noise traders provide the supply function that has the same elasticity as in the static model but a different intercept S(p t−1 ) = 0.
The intercept p t−1 reflects the equilibrium price in the previous period, as it incorporates the information revealed to the public in that period. Informed traders submit their demand schedule to an auctioneer who clears the market as in the static model.
To maximize the expected payoff of the transaction in t, trader i buys the asset in t if b i,t ≥ p t and does not buy otherwise. There is no dynamic aspect involved in the traders' decision other than updating the belief.
Informed traders observe their private information history x t i = (x i,1 , x i,2 , . . . , x i,t ). I study a sequence of static equilibria (p t , a t , b t ), t = 1, 2, . . ., such that the action a i,t maximizes trader i's expected period payoff under the subjective belief b i,t (defined for the state H as before), which is consistent with the trader's observation.
The prior belief at the initial period is common, b i,0 = b 0 , but the belief is allowed to evolve stochastically as the traders draw information repeatedly. Thus, the belief in each period t > 0 is heterogeneous across traders with a particular structure wherein the heterogeneity stems only from the distribution functions F and G that are ordered by MLRP.
Given an action profile history a t−1 , all traders are divided into 2 t−1 groups according to their action history a t−1 i . Let n k,t denote the number of traders in the k-th group for k = 1, 2, . . . , 2 t−1 (hence,
k=1 n k,t = N ), and m k,t denote the number of buying traders in the same group. Let X k,s for s < t denote the domain of x i,s that is consistent with a s i under the threshold strategy supposed in Proposition 6 for trader i who belongs to group k. The likelihood ratios revealed by an action history of a non-buying trader i and a buying trader j in group k are written as follows:
In the static model, informed traders submit the demand schedule conditional on p m , where the conditioning on p m is equivalent to conditioning on m. In the dynamically extended model, I assume that informed traders submit their demand schedules conditional on the vector of the number of buying traders in each group, (m k,t ) k . Let P k,t denote the information inferred by trader i in group k. P k,t is written as
I show that the equilibrium threshold strategy still exists in this setup.
Proposition 6
For each realization of x t , there exists an equilibrium outcome (m k,t )
and thresholdsx t such that the action profile a t satisfies the optimal threshold rule:
The proof is deferred to Appendix A. The tatonnement process is characterized by a mixture of binomial distributions, which asymptotically follows a Poisson distribution.
The threshold decreases over steps during the tatonnement within each node of history, and hence, we have a well-defined tatonnement process where a chain reaction of buying actions is possible.
Self-organized criticality
In this dynamic extension, traders accumulate private information that is independent across periods. Thus, through Bayesian learning by observing private information and aggregate actions, traders eventually learn the true state almost surely.
Proposition 7
The subjective belief b i,t converges to 1 as t → ∞ almost surely.
Proof: The likelihood ratio for the private information history, t τ =1 δ(x i,τ ), converges to zero as in Billingsley [6] . The proof is outlined as follows. The likelihood ratio θ i,t follows a martingale in the probability measure of the private information under 20 the true state: E(θ i,t | θ i,t−1 , H) = θ i,t−1 . Further, the likelihood ratio is bounded from below at zero by construction. Then, the martingale convergence theorem asserts that the likelihood ratio converges in distribution to a random variable. Moreover, the probability measures represented by the distributions F T and G T for a sequence of private information (x i,1 , x i,2 , . . . , x i,T ) are mutually singular when T → ∞, since x i,t is independent across t. Then, t τ =1 δ i,τ converges to zero. Hence, θ i,t converges to zero if P k,t remains finite for t → ∞. P k,t is finite for a finitex t when N is finite. Whenx t tends to a positive infinity, P k,t decreases to a finite value since A k,t and B k,t are decreasing inx t and positive. Whenx t tends to a negative infinity, all traders eventually choose to buy. Hence, h A n h,t −m h,t h,t tends to one, and
h,t /B k,t . I showed that B k,t < (1/p t − 1)/(θ 0 P k,t ) in the proof of Proposition 6. If P k,t tends to a positive infinity asx t tends to a negative infinity, then, this inequality contradicts the fact that P k,t tends to Π h B m h,t h,t /B k,t for any finite N . Thus, P k,t is finite as t → ∞. Hence, θ i,t is dominated by private information as t → ∞ and converges to zero, and b i,t converges to 1 almost surely. The convergence of belief to the true state H means that all traders will buy eventually. This implies that some traders start buying even without any other trader buying at some point of the process toward convergence. Such a buying action triggers the chain reaction of buying. Thus, the converging belief assures that the triggering actions eventually occur and almost surely cause the fat-tailed aggregate actions. The logic is analogous to the self-organized criticality proposed by Bak et al. [3] . In Bak's sand-pile model, the distribution of avalanche size depends on a slowly-varying variable (the slope of the sand pile), and the dynamics of the slope variable has a global sink exactly at the critical point at which the avalanche size exhibits a power-law distribution.
In our model, the average belief corresponds to the slope in the sand-pile model. The chain reaction is rarely triggered when the average belief is far below the threshold.
As private information accumulates, the average belief increases toward the threshold.
This ensures that the triggering buying action will occur eventually.
Numerical results on volumes and returns distributions
In Section 3.1, I derived the power-law distribution analytically without specifying F and G, but only asymptotically when N is taken to infinity and F is taken to G. In this section, I show by numerical simulations that the probability distribution of the minimum equilibrium aggregate action m * follows a dampened power law when N is finite for a parametrized distribution of private information. In the simulations, I set the number of informed traders N as finite but relatively large: 500 and 1000. It is extensively discussed in the literature as to how informed traders' trades are incorporated in prices. For example, the no-trade theorem by Milgrom and Stokey [29] argued that no stable relation between the price and trades is necessarily predicted if the price reflects the publicly available information instantly. Smith [33] showed that a trader's timing of trade will not be affected by public information either, since the price movement that reflects the public information will cancel out the effect of the public information on the trader's belief. Considering this difficulty, Avery and Zemsky [1] proposed that another dimension of uncertainty is needed for herd behavior models to deal with stock price fluctuations. In this paper, I follow Gabaix et al. [15] who A profile of private information x is randomly drawn 100,000 times, and m * is computed for each draw. The simulated distribution of returns is compared to the empirical distribution in A power-law tail implies that the distribution belongs to the domain of the attraction of a stable law, i.e., the sum of the random variables distributed according to a power law also follows the power law with the same exponent. Thus, if the herd size of traders follows a power law independently in each period, the cumulated size of the herds over periods should also follow a power law with the same exponent. If the power law is truncated exponentially, the central limit theorem comes into effect in the accumulation, and thus, the cumulated herd size would converge to a normal distribution as the time horizon increases. Hence, the distribution of herd size will exhibit a transition from a fat tail to a normal tail as the time horizon of the return increases. This is indeed empirically observed in the stock returns (Mantegna and Stanley [28] ).
Discussions
Variation in market microstructure
In the benchmark model above, I characterize the distribution of the smallest equilib- When traders know the selection rule, they not only know the number of buying and non-buying traders at p m but also know that there is no equilibrium at a price below p m . Thus, they infer that there are at least k + 1 traders buying at p k for any k < m. This is equivalent to the fact that there are two traders with information greater thanx(1) and one trader with x i ≥x(k) for each k = 2, 3, . . . , m − 1. The threshold condition is modified as 
Discrete actions
The discreteness of the action space plays an important role in the rational herd be- corresponds to the empirical finding by Hau [19] that the volatility of stock prices is increased by an increase in transaction costs.
The effect of the transaction costs on the aggregate fluctuations can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that traders need to trade a certain amount of assets in each year. Suppose that traders can divide the total amount into monthly transactions if the transaction cost is low, whereas they can afford only one transaction a year if the transaction cost is high. If traders tend to herd in transactions due to the revelation of private information associated with the transactions, I observe a small monthly herding when the transaction cost is low, whereas I observe a large yearly herding when the transaction cost is high. If the herd involves all the traders at once, and if the total volume traded per year is fixed at X, the second moment of daily volume is 12(X/12) 2 /365 in the case of monthly herdings while it is X 2 /365 in yearly herdings.
Thus, while the Tobin tax does shift the occurrence of herding from the high frequency domain to low, it can result in an increase in the daily volatility of trades.
The present model assumes a discrete state space in addition to the binary action.
Even in a continuous state space, however, the structure of the information revelation will not be altered. This is because traders still form a threshold behavior, and thus, the revealed private information is lumped into two groups, below or above the threshold.
The essential environment for the threshold rule, which is the necessary ingredient for the stochastic chain reaction, is that the action space is coarser than the state space so that the private information is not fully revealed by actions.
The binary state space, or the "either-or" uncertainty, arises typically when two This paper mainly aims at explaining the fat-tailed fluctuations observed in the high-frequency domain for which the empirical evidence is most supportive. However, some empirical studies such as Jansen and de Vries [20] and Longin [26] suggest that the largest crashes and booms in the history can be understood as an extreme event within the same power-law tail, instead of being outliers. Authors such as Lee [24] and Chari and Kehoe [10] pursue to apply the logic of herd behavior to rare large events such as market crashes. Our model is consistent with their view that market crashes are caused by the same mechanism that causes price fluctuations in normal times. Of course, the uncertainty on asset fundamentals varies in terms of its impact on prices, and the underlying uncertainties for the historic crashes are probably more potent than the uncertainties that drive daily fluctuations. However, for both crashes and daily fluctuations, the traders exchange their information through the same market mechanism. Thus, low-frequency events and high-frequency events may well share the same mechanism through which the traders' views crystallize collectively.
Information structure
In an illuminating paper, Gabaix et al. [15] provide an explanation for the power laws in stock volumes and returns by focusing on trader heterogeneity. They start from the observation that trader size follows a power law, and argue that the power law with networked traders such as Cont and Bouchaud [11] and Stauffer and Sornette [36] . They explain the power-law distributions of returns with heterogeneous or localized reference groups of traders generated by an exogenous random process. In contrast, this paper shows that stochastic herding with a power law distribution emerges in the symmetric structure of information inference among traders. The model can be extended to incorporate the heterogeneous information structure that modifies the threshold (8) . The analytical method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations by the fictitious tatonnement remains valid, and the resulting distribution will be affected by the heterogeneity in the traders' reference groups.
Conclusion
This δ(x i,τ ).
It follows that δ(x t (P k,t , x t−1 i )) t−1 τ =1 δ(x i,τ ) is equal to (1/p t − 1)/(θ 0 P k,t ), and thus, is constant across i in group k. Then, A k,t > (1/p t − 1)/(θ 0 P k,t ) > B k,t can be shown as follows. The numerator of A k,t is expanded as 
The integral in (26) is equal to the denominator of A k,t , and thus, A k,t > (1/p t − 1)/(θ 0 P k,t ) holds. Similarly, I obtain B k,t < (1/p t − 1)/(θ 0 P k,t ).
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Suppose that m t increases due to an increase in m k,t . P k,t decreases by A k,t > B k,t and (18). Then,x t needs to adjust in order to satisfy (23) . By using A k,t > (1/p t − 1)/(θ 0 P k,t ) > B k,t , I get that the logarithms of A k,t and B k,t are decreasing inx t as in the static model. Further, δ(x t ) is decreasing inx t . Thus,x t in (23) decreases in response to the increase in m t . The decreasingx t entails a non-decreasing reaction function of m t+1 defined for each realization of x t . Hence, the existence of an equilibrium is established by Tarski's fixed point theorem. This completes the proof.
The informational tatonnement process is characterized by a set of binomial distributions with probability q k,u and population n k . When m k andx u −x u+1 are small and n k is large, the binomial allows a Poisson approximation. Thus, the sum of traders who buy in step u is approximated by a Poisson with mean k n k q k,u . Hence, the tatonnement approximately follows a Poisson branching process.
